19

Worst *Polis*

POLIS AS INJUSTICE

La cité, ce mal nécessaire.

—E. WILL, IN LETTER TO PH. GAUTHIER (JANUARY 9, 1987)

Since the State emerged out of the need to keep down class conflict, and since it emerged out of the conflict of these classes, it generally takes the form of the State of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which by means of the state becomes the politically dominant Class, and hence acquires new means to dominate and exploit the subordinate class. Thus, the ancient state was above all the state of the slave-owners with a view to the domination of the slaves, just as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility with a view to the domination of free and subordinate peasants, and the modern representative state tool of the exploitation of salaried labour by capital.

—F. ENGELS, *THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PROPERTY AND THE STATE* (1881)

Polis as Exclusion

The citizens of the *polis* of Hērakleia, when they met in assembly, took a decision that affected "the *koinon* of the islanders," a description of the *polis* as commonwealth that idealized the citizenry as the inhabitants of the territory, just as the gods they invoked were "those who hold the island." Yet the decree itself declared its concern for the safety of "all Herakleiotes and those inhabiting [the island]," the latter group being distinguished from the group of citizens. Even though it is the latter who exclusively meet and vote, the noncitizens are affected by the decision. Apart from not raising goats, they will almost certainly have to contribute (as part of the commonwealth) to the levies to finance the court proceedings in which the *polis* will be a party in case of fatal conflict over illicit and indeed illegitimate goat-raising.

Though the group of citizens, *Hērakleiōtai*, is made up of the only ones entitled to take the decisions, it *represents*, in all senses of the term, the whole human community on the island, whose interests it defends. Our earlier confrontation with the violence, conflict, and possibility for manipulation involved in the transaction forces us to admit that the image of Herakleiote citizens defending the safety of all the inhabitants is a fiction. This sort of fiction, positing solidarity between citizens and the rest of the social population within a *polis*, can be seen in civic festivals—for instance, those documented in the second century BCE at Magnēsia on Maeander. There, the citizens decide on a festival for Zeus Sōsipolis (*Polis*-saving) that is meant to benefit the whole population; the citizens also stipulate the participation of everyone in the city. That the same mechanisms (citizen decision-making, population participation in solidarity) were used to force the integration of the population of a Seleukid colony in Jerusalem (including the Jewish population) is a reminder of the power differential involved in such events, under the ideology of solidarity.[1]

The inequality in power between different groups in the *polis* resulted from the basic, constitutive relationship of exclusion. This can be read in many other manifestations of civic culture. The beauty of the built environment at Priēnē (fig. 1.3), melding public and private, was a reminder that certain people were stakeholders in the *polis* and in its autonomous existence as materialized by its splendid, orderly, and perennial monuments (fig. 19.1)—but that others were not: the enslaved, the foreigners, the serf-like tributary "Plainsmen" in their villages (fig. 1.5).[2] Earlier (chapter 15), I affirmed the validity and the centrality of the Aristotelian conception of the *polis* as a political community of members having access to institutions of deliberative decision-making, government, and adjudication. I hence called for an Aristotelian understanding of *polis* as society (which I schematized as its civic, civil, and marginal forms). But this definition comes with an inescapable consequence: namely the exclusion, according to different modes, of women, children, enslaved people, strangers—and even, at least potentially or as a temptation, of certain groups of free-born native men, on grounds of poverty, occupation, or distance from the urban center.

Hence the *polis* was a patriarchy, an enslavement society, a nativist organization, and a polity haunted by the model of an urban aristocracy. In this chapter, I will explore these aspects as a further, interlocking set of social bads that potentially constitute the *polis* as tragedy. The consequences of this scheme combine with earlier structures of analysis to offer the possibility of a multidimensional vision of the *polis*.

Patriarchy, Age and Gender

As a patriarchy, the *polis* was a society of fathers, excluding children from the public sphere as immature, unfinished, and hence institutionally incompetent individuals.[3] These incomplete persons were managed within the household: as vehicles



FIGURE 19.1. The *agora* of Priēnē, as reimagined in Krischen 1938 (drawing by H. Horn). The late second-century BCE decrees were inscribed on the inside wall of the portico.

for property transmission (especially for the elite) and as sources of labor (especially for the poor). The management of the supply of children belonged to household issues of property and livelihood. In this context, some children (their plentiful ranks already ravaged by very high rates of disease and infantile mortality) were probably victims of physical violence, starting with exposure of unwanted infants (especially female), which usually led to death or enslavement.[4] A grim reminder of this violence is the well in which the remains of hundreds of infants and small children (including a battered toddler) were thrown along with sacrificed

puppies as ritual offerings, in the Athens of the late second-century BCE Indian Summer, in a blind alley just off the Agora, filled with its institutional and extra-institutional interactions.[5] It is true that we do not know the social status of the children whose remains were thrown in the "Agora Bone Well," but it is likely that many were born to noncitizens (resident foreigners or enslaved residents), compounding their precarity and vulnerability. In addition, children of all social statuses were subject to routine physical punishment at the hands of adult male citizens, or at least with their approval and at their urging, as part of their education and upbringing. Finally, boys and adolescents were caught in nexuses of erotic and sexual relations, imposed by adult male citizens as part of their habitus, albeit fraught with anxieties and complexities.[6]

Patriarchy excluded women from political institutions as a matter of course. On the island of Hērakleia, the decision to ban the raising of goats, the binding oath, the prosecution in case of fatal outcomes of self-help, were all conducted by the adult male citizens, even if the decision affected all the inhabitants of the island; for instance, labor arrangements in the household must have shifted in consequence of the decision. Adult women of citizen households labored under life-long institutional incompetence in the decision-making realm but also in the legal sphere where, theoretically, they needed the approval of a male representative (*kurios*, literally "lord") for economic transactions. In Athens, women could only undertake transactions worth one *medimnos*—about 50 liters—of barley or less.[7] Yet, though legally property-less dependents, women were crucial for the transmission of property and the reproduction of citizen households, both economically and in terms of legal status after the generalization of the rule of descent from citizen parents as part of the definition of the citizen body (as we have seen: above, chapter 15). The structural importance of women for citizen households is reflected in the emergence, during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, of a terminology for female citizenship (such as the word *politis*, "she-citizen," or the use of female "ethnic" markers such as *Xanthia*, "female member of the *polis* of Xanthos").[8] I have argued above that these new markers do not remove institutionalized and constitutive subordination.

More directly, the importance of legitimate birth for the transmission of citizen status, the passing on of property, and the reproduction of households, entailed control of citizen women's sexuality, the valorization of their virginity when unmarried, and the protection of their fidelity after marriage.[9] An Athenian man of the early fourth century BCE, on trial for having killed his wife's lover (probably after entrapping him), claimed to have acted for the sake of the whole citizen body.[10] Later in the fourth century BCE, the comedies of the Athenian poet Menandros portrayed stories involving lovers, mistresses, rapes, and the concerns of citizen fathers and sons. The plays reflect anxieties about the reproduction of citizen households, especially at a time when frequent changes in political regime affected the composition of the citizen body.[11] Ideally (and ideologically), adult male citi-

zens managed and controlled their women (daughters, sisters, others) as they moved between generations and households. Older men (in their thirties) married younger wives, often in their mid to late teens, when the latter could be controlled physically and psychologically. Xenophon provides a memorable (if fictional and idealized) description of such a teen bride received in her husband's house, in a dialogue between Ischomachos, an elite Athenian, and the hanger-on Sōkratēs:[12]

> "Ischomachos, I would gladly hear this from you, namely: did you yourself educate your wife to be of the right sort, or did she know how to take care of her duties when you received her from her father and mother?"
>
> "And just what knowledge could she have had, Sōkratēs, when I took her over? She was not yet fifteen when she came to me, and earlier she had lived under close care, with a view that she should see as little as possible, hear as little, and say as little as possible. Does it not seem to you a fine thing, if when she came the most she knew was how to produce a cloak when given wool, had seen only how wool-working tasks was allocated to the female slave? Since she came perfectly well trained as concerns her stomach, Sōkratēs; which I regard as the greatest form of training for man and woman alike."
>
> "But in other respects, Ischomachos, said I, did you educate your wife yourself, so that she should be competent to perform her duties?"
>
> "No, by Zeus, Sōkratēs, at least not until I had first offered sacrifice and prayed that I might teach, and she might learn, that which was best for the both of us."
>
> "And then, said I, did your wife not join with you in these same sacrifices and prayers?"
>
> "Indeed, she earnestly vowed to the gods to behave as she should, and it was clear to see that she would not neglect the lessons she was being taught."

Noticeable is the teenage bride's socialization in matters concerning "her stomach"; that is, her appetite for food. "Archaic" poets such as Hesiod (in the eighth century BCE) or Sēmonidēs (in the seventh century BCE) attest the household head's control of access to nutrition. "Women stole food because they were kept half-starved by their husbands who resented their habit of eating," in M. West's sarcastic formulation: the reproach of overeating comes from a conception of women as consumers of household resources, supposed to be generated by the patriarch's labor.[13] Such casual misogyny participated in a broader ideological construction of gender, pervasive in *polis* culture. Sēmonidēs's portrayal of women as divided in animal-like species in his poetry, which was sung in men's gatherings, coincides precisely with the moment of *polis* consolidation. Later, "Classical' Greek art from the fifth century BCE onwards, represents female bodies in ways predicated on a male gaze, male desire or contempt.[14]

Conceptions of gender also presided over the distribution of male and female bodies in space. Ideally, women's work was confined to the house's interior, and

even the special spaces within the house. In practice, even when they had to move outside the household, women's lives were segregated from the public world of men, and the *polis* institutionalized control over women's lives and movements by appointing special officials (*gynaikonomoi*, literally "administrators of women").[15] The minimizing of female agency and consent was one corollary of a gender regime that placed citizen women and their reproductive capacities in a nexus of status and property. Another was the production of romantic or sentimental myths that tried to camouflage the contradictions within this regime (while maintaining complicity with coercion, violence, and rape).[16]A third corollary was the wide availability of cheap prostitution, usually by enslaved workers.[17] The *sumposion* or drinking party, a crucial institution in the *polis* from its early days onwards, was a locus for adult men to perform solidarity through shared rituals, texts, and activities. These included the actual exclusion of citizen-status women, the exploration of self and other through song and through playacting on the boundaries of identity (including racial ones), and social and sexual commerce with female performers and sex-workers, of noncitizen and often non-free status.[18]

The latter women were often subject to physical violence; but violence was generalized in matters of gender. The boundaries defining female condition were policed through violence—actual (in a play by Aristophanes, an Athenian wife is threatened with a punch for asking about politics: below, p. 529)[19] and organized (Xenophon represents Ischomachos putting in great efforts to construct his teenage wife's agency and to constitute her whole world).

Polis as Enslavement Society

The adult male citizens, in addition to controlling women, were slaveholders, holding slaves as part of the household but also outside it.[20] Enslavement involved both legal ownership of enslaved human beings and their "social death" (O. Patterson) in the form of denial of all honor and personhood. Both manifestations were dialectically connected. Ownership led to the social death of the enslaved, who were often renamed by their enslavers as an initial act of erasure of social ties and subjected to ill-treatments expressing and enabling for their objectification. Conversely, the ultimate consequence of social death for the enslaved was being treated as an object or an animal, the "man-footed thing" (*andrapodon*, calqued off *tetrapodon*, the "four-footed thing"—an equivalent might be "manstock," as in "livestock").

Manstock had no recognized human honor but only value as a commodity, and hence was treated as such in economic transactions: it was sold, leased, or offered as collateral in financial transactions.[21] The *polis* was a complex slaveholder society, whose economic basis, workings, and self-imagination all rested on the enslavement of humans.[22] Slaveholding was widespread throughout the economy of the *poleis*, starting with the agricultural territory: the towers that appear in the islands

(one is attested on Hērakleia), may have been connected with the control of enslaved workers. It is true that we cannot be sure exactly who owned the agricultural slaves that are abundantly attested in the literary evidence. But even if slave-owning was unevenly distributed within the agrarian population (poorer families may have relied on oxen, their own work power, family contributions, and mutual aid), enslaved workforces undoubtedly sustained the elite cash-cropping that was a vital part of *poleis* such as Chios, Kerkyra, or Rhodes.[23]

Enslaved workers were also a vital part of the nonagricultural economy, present in the large-scale enterprises of elite investors; for instance, workshops or gangs of specialized workers hired out for extractive activities such as mining but also moneymaking affairs such as prostitution (thus fulfilling the potential, for the enslavers, of the enslaved person as a chattel that could be exploited and made to yield income). Enslaved labor was also crucial in smaller affairs: individual craftsmen worked side by side with enslaved assistants but pocketed the latter's salary, "small investors" owned a slave and hired him out for fixed rent, enslaved craftsmen were set up to work independently but surrendered most of the proceeds. All these phenomena are well attested for the diversified economy of fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athens (flush with cash and slaves from empire and its aftermath),[24] but also appear in the diversified economy of a small, nameless *polis* that was unified with or annexed by Teōs (above, p. 209). From the temporary tax incentives offered by Teōs, it is clear that slaves could be hired out for labor, gather firewood, make charcoal, or generally work in an economy of "wood-selling" (*xylopōliē*), a cash-making, profit-driven sector crucial for a small mountain *polis* (even if we do not know the size or distribution of the enslaved workforce).[25]

Away from the world of profit chasing at different scales, enslaved workers performed labor in the household, as well as serving as status symbols for elite women and men. Gravestone reliefs (fig. 9.1, fig. 10.4) complement the civic imagery for their subjects (whose economic substance, social capital, and civic-mindedness are celebrated) with figures of slaves. These are shown at a smaller scale and with subaltern postures, showing their lack of social status and, more simply, tiredness and stress.[26]

Since slavery was interwoven in the economics of the *polis*, it also was integral to its political economy. In this book, we have emphasized the role played in the formation of the *polis* by two interconnected phenomena, public goods and redistribution of elite wealth; it is time to realize their dependency on enslaved labor. Public goods could be directly produced by enslaved labour. This is the case of the marble and metal ore mines that ensured the early prosperity of Thasos and Siphnos, and later the imperial might of Athens: the exploitation of such resources must have employed enslaved technicians and laborers on a large scale (the actual arrangements probably involved private contractors rather than direct use of enslaved labour by the *polis*). Public goods were also produced by the redistribution of elite wealth, tapped directly and indirectly by taxation, liturgies, services, and

semi-voluntary benefactions, in order to provide public goods. This social resource was largely created by enslaved labor, agricultural or artisanal, on the estates or in the workshops owned by the elite. Slavery also sustained the "Mediterranean" regime that characterized the *polis*: enslaved labor, however distributed, made possible the cash crops (especially wine) that were exported to buy staple products such as grain, and more slaves, or that was were exchanged between locales to generate profit and growth (above, pp. 473–74).

Because of their dependency on slavery, the *poleis* were avid markets for enslaved humans, procured from a variety of sources including under-urbanized regions such as Thrace, the eastern Adriatic coast, and inland Anatolia. These regions existed as zones of violence and enslavement that fed the need of the *poleis* in exchange for products of the *polis* economies such as wine or coined silver. This is only one way in which the phenomena of slavery are corollaries or effects of developments in civic practice. The consolidation of community solidarity and the absolute protection of the bodily integrity of citizens, whose status precluded the intracommunal enslavement of poorer members by the elite, entailed the need for enslaved labor from outside the *polis*, as a concrete consequence of civic ideals and institutions.

I earlier wrote about the importance of the citizen's dignity, as protected by *polis* law and institutions (above, chapter 16): a proto-Rawlsian good distributed equally among the citizens with political consequences, and a factor for the trust and commitment in the civic community, with a virtuous cycle of good economic and social outcomes. But a corollary of this landscape of dignity was the construction of a class of people denied dignity and honor within the community. The phenomenon is best attested in the case of early sixth-century BCE Attica, in the case of the "Solonian" reforms and the still poorly understood political turmoil that resulted (above, chapter 5). As E. Wood writes, "the relative unavailability of Athenian free producers for exploitation was itself a critical factor leading to the growth of slavery. In a sense, the free time of the poor was won at the expense of slave labor for the rich."[27] Similar situations (though the details are even more obscure than sixth-century BCE Athens) may be at work in the early *poleis* of Asia Minor with their serf populations, or at Chios, a center for winegrowing, an early example of institutional development and one of the earliest places to adopt chattel slavery (or so later Greeks affected to believe). M. Finley famously and influentially wrote that "one aspect of Greek history, in short, is the advance, hand in hand, of freedom and slavery,"[28] a view of "Archaic" Greek history and the rise of citizenship that has been nuanced but still deserves consideration.[29] M. Finley further quotes a figure of the German Enlightenment, the legal theorist Johann Friedrich Reitemeier, who in a history of ancient slavery published in 1789 pointedly associated subordination with "civil society" (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), since the latter is incompatible with universalism.[30]

Indeed, citizenship was defined in institutional and ideological terms as the apanage of freeborn members of the political community: for these men, freedom

was the basic characteristic (as can be seen in Aristotle's *Politics,* where *hoi eleutheroi,* the free or rather the poor freeborn citizens, are the foundation of the democratic *polis*). We earlier defined this quality in terms of freedom from subordination to the wealth elite in the community, but the citizen's freedom also was conceived in terms of not being enslaved, and hence of potentially being slaveholders. The internal solidarity of the *polis* was about relations between mass and elite, but also about the control and exploitation of slaves. *Polis* as society was made up of members who aided each other in controlling slaves, Plato notes.[31] *Polis* as state deployed its institutions to control slaves, for instance by making escape difficult: Plato's ideal state expects active participation of citizens and magistrates in this task.

A concrete example comes from the cities of Milētos and Hērakleia under Latmos, which, in concluding peace after one of the local conflicts characteristic of the Indian Summer of the second-century BCE, made detailed provisions concerning the return of runaway slaves, including finder's fees, reimbursement for food, and the right to sell off unclaimed slaves (the task was entrusted to border guards, an office held by a tax farmer who expected to profit from his activities).[32] In addition, the *polis* managed and derived income from the exit out of slavery. The fees paid by the enslaved to purchase their (conditional and limited) freedom profited to individual enslavers (the money allowed them to purchase a replacement and perpetuate the system, as well as profit from it), but part of the fee was paid to the *polis*'s treasury. in general. The second-century BCE institutionalization of Thessalian cities (which I draw attention to as the acceleration of *polis* normalcy in Thessaly after the end of Antigonid control in 196 BCE, above, p. 277) may have been financed by fees paid by manumitted slaves; this source of public income continued to be important subsequently.[33] Such processes were the first time that enslaved individuals dealt directly and as their own persons with the laws of the *polis* under whose protection citizen members flourished.

The practicalities of enslavement involved violence and degradation, which we can see in many forms, starting with the beatings and angry whippings that literary sources, from Plato to Galen, mention as a regrettable aspect of slave-owning (because it demeaned the *masters*). It is also Plato who explicitly tells us (through an oligarchical, might-is-right character in the *Gorgias*) that the enslaved were denied the ability to help their loved ones against harm—an unspeakably cruel, abusive yet routine consequence of slavery.[34] Physical harm abounded. In Athens and elsewhere, the testimony of slaves was admissible in court only under torture, "proven" as by a touchstone (the world *basanos* designates both) through the overwhelming ordeal of whipping or joint dislocation on the rack.

The resistance of the enslaved was often broken by specialized techniques of domination and management, or punished by death. At Amyzōn, a slave killed his master as the latter was sleeping and set fire to the house—the dead man's epitaph tells us that "for my sake, my fellow citizens crucified the perpetrator and left him

for the beasts and the birds." The citizens undertook the punishment as a matter of public interest. The incident took place not far, in time and space, from the cities of Milētos and Hērakleia that struck an agreement about the return of runaway slaves, in the time of the free cities of Karia during the Indian Summer of the late second century BCE.[35] Another horrendous example comes from the fifth-century BCE, in the time of the Athenian empire: a man accused of murder and tried in Athens mentioned, as part of his argumentation, an 11-year old enslaved boy who stabbed his enslaver but lacked the nerve to finish him off: if the enslaver had died without his killer being known, every slave in the household would have been executed. "In the event, he was caught and subsequently confessed his guilt."[36] In a chilling omission, the speaker does not need to mention that the boy was certainly put to death.

Polis as Exclusion: Foreigners

By definition as an in-group of members enjoying the civic solidarity and the protection, direct and indirect, that resulted from access to institutional power, the *polis* was not open to foreigners, including long-term residents. This state of affairs resulted logically from the definition of the citizen body in terms of birth from citizen parents (above, pp. 230, 431).[37] In the *polis* foreigners could not own land (a restriction relaxed during the Roman empire or circumvented by multiple citizenship-holding by the elite). Additionally, they had no direct access to judicial institutions, needing representation by citizen patrons, known as "protectors," *prostatai*, in fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athens (just as citizen women needed representation by their *kurios* in matters of property and law). A piece of comic literature, set in Kōs, suggests that this practice was widespread (below). In Athens at least, resident foreigners paid a tax for the privilege of residence, even while being liable for financial service and even military duties.[38] The liability of resident foreigners for *leitourgia* reflects the wealth enjoyed by some of them, such as the rich individuals who appear in fourth-century BCE Athens, or the well-connected and wealthy foreigners in third- and second-century BCE Milētos and Knidos.[39] But this wealth was burdened with institutional incompetence and duties without rights.

The institution of resident foreigners was widespread (under different names—*metoikoi, paroikoi*—or periphrases). A dialogue of Herōdas in the third century BCE portrays resident foreigners in the democratic *polis* of Kōs for comic effect: the brothel-keeper Battaros, arguing a case in court against another foreigner (both have duly taken citizen "protectors").[40] Perhaps resident foreigners were also present in smaller *poleis*, such as Hērakleia. Certainly the institutional landscape makes frequent provisions for foreigners, resident or transient. For instance, in the *polis* of Bargylia, *metoikoi* were plentiful enough to constitute a quasi-civic body, which received subsidies for ox-rearing alongside civic subdivisions, for the festival

of Artemis.[41] In a peace treaty between Tēmnos and Klazomenai, provision was made for a special joint tribunal to judge any future disputes between those cities: the judges were to swear an oath to render fair judgment "for the Temnians and Klazomenians, and the *metoikoi* and the others of those living in both cities."[42]

The arrangement is all the more striking because it existed in a Mediterranean world that was structurally based on high mobility and connectedness, where goods but also people circulated by choice and by necessity (above, chapter 17);[43] exchanges intensified during the Hellenistic period, from the late fourth to the late second centuries BCE, precisely at the time of the great convergence of *polis* forms and generalization of a democratic model that emphasized solidarity but also exclusion.[44] In a series of classic articles, Ph. Gauthier proposed an interpretation of the restrictive nature of *polis* citizenship as a reflection of the centrality of participation in communal activities and access to institutions (in contrast with Roman citizenship, which, Gauthier claims, operated as a status). Gauthier's view has been nuanced, notably as concerns the lived realities of citizenship and foreignness, but still usefully accounts for the closed nature of membership in the *polis* as political community.[45] It is significant that Gauthier elaborated this view on the basis of documentary evidence from the Hellenistic period (his area of particular specialization).

Citizenship, the result of birth from citizen parents, was emmeshed within civic institutions: the household, the subdivisions of civic society that had to accept the new citizen (a process best documented in Athens but probably widespread across the *poleis*), and central institutions that registered citizens for administrative and political purposes (especially services to the *polis*). Citizenship grants were bestowed by the whole community, by a vote: even if the practice grew more common as time went on (including women among the recipients), especially against payment of a fee, there never arose a formal avenue of automatic access to citizenship for strangers or for resident foreigners (among whom manumitted slaves were included).[46] This, too, is a consequence of an Aristotelian, institutionally focused *polis*.

The closed nature of the *polis* citizens as a group of entitled members explains its representation as an essentialized descent group. The mid-fifth-century BCE Athenian restriction of citizenship to those born of two citizen parents[47] was undoubtedly a response to the specific conditions and opportunities of the fifth-century BCE imperial democracy, but its influence among the *poleis* of the great convergence shows its adequation with civic ideology. Collective descent was reified and fetishized in the claims that *poleis*, as human communities, were somehow entirely and directly descendants from a founding figure. Such claims enabled peer-polity interaction (since *poleis* could construct relations amongst themselves as connected by relations of kinship between their mythical founders), and also strengthened internal solidarity, since mythical pasts expressed local identity and acted as a proxy for autonomy (notably during the Roman empire).

The resulting conception of the *polis* was a nativist ideology, or even a "racialist" conception of membership and community, in the striking formulation proposed by S. Lape for democratic Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. This nativism was part of the great convergence in *polis* practices and discourses, in that the conception of the *polis* as descent group expressed the democratic collectivization of aristocratic claims to noble ancestry (above, p. 431). It is no coincidence that local history, with its insistence on local identity, narratives, and the bond between descent groups' past and place, gains widespread popularity during the great convergence starting in the fourth century BCE.[48]

The fiction of collective descent was directly connected to the crucial role of civic virtue in the workings of the *polis*, conceived as a just polity because it represented the communitarian will of the many, but also because its individual members lived good and moral lives geared toward the common good (above, chapter 16). Nativism emphasized the innate qualifications of citizens to live just lives as stakeholders in a moral community; the trope underlies the general clauses of many honorific decrees. The concept implies that natural-born citizens are uniquely invested in the common good of their community through their connection with other members of the civic community, the community's memory, religious experience, and sense of place (as celebrated in rituals and monuments). The conflation of self-interest and morality is of course quite typical of virtue politics in the *polis*. Equally typical is another implication of nativism, namely the idealization of the *polis*. Individual citizens are just because the *polis* by nature, and hence every *polis*, is a venue for the performance of human excellence, in which citizens participate by their civic activity.

Nativist tropes are found in institutional practice: for instance, the insistence that candidates for office in Athens could trace descent from citizen ascendants for two generations on both sides, were registered in a local subdivision (deme), participated in cults of "ancestral Apollōn" and "household Zeus," paid their taxes, served in the military, and treated their parents well. Speakers before the *polis*, in assembly or in courts, spoke of the innate qualities of good citizens—the trope occurs in the Attic orators of the fourth century BCE as well as that none-too-successful local politician in Roman-era Prousa, Cocceianus Diōn—and excoriated asocial types as foreigners, outsiders hostile by nature to the political community. Democratic solidarity, as expressed and metaphorized in nativism, came at the cost of constructing strangers to the community and constantly excluding them.[49]

Town and Country

Even the native population in the *polis* was riven with potential divisions. Admittedly, it is tempting to posit a "normal" model of the *polis* (to use an expression coined by E. Ruschenbusch) that favors the integration of rural settlements and minimizes the opposition between city and country. This can be imagined in two

possible ways.[50] In the first iteration of this model, applying especially to the case of small *poleis,* the territory is largely cultivated by citizen farmers, commuting (if necessary for hours) from a densely inhabited urban center to dispersed agricultural holdings, which allows for diversification and risk mitigation. This is how we might imagine the island of Hērakleia being cultivated (though the modern island was divided between four villages) or indeed any other small *polis,* a category abundantly illustrated in this book. The island of Hērakleia covers about 18 square kilometers, and, as mentioned earlier (chapter 1), the vast majority of *poleis* had a territory under 500 square kilometers, which would fit in a circle with a radius of 12.62 kilometers, so that most citizens could commute out to their fields.[51] If poor, the citizen farmer has no slaves or a few slaves who live with him; if rich, the citizen-farmer might have gangs of enslaved workers residing in the rural territory and taking care of his estates.

Second, since the territory of larger *poleis* cannot be conceived as being exclusively worked by town-dwelling farmers, their territories are ideally structured by a network of nucleated settlements, fractally reproducing at a smaller scale the central settlement and occupied by citizens. The denizens of these settlements were integrated within the *polis* by the formal recognition of their settlements as civic subdivisions of the whole, by financial compensation for political service and attendance in the urban center, and by institutional representation at the political center. The best-documented example is Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, after the "Kleisthenic" reform that formalized and capped a long process of integration. As we have seen, similar systems seem to have generally existed in large *poleis,* for instance at Argos, Eretria, Milētos, or Samos (above, chapters 10, 15). This type of organization represents a particular application of the civic society of subdivisions by which every *polis* was structured.

Thus E. Ruschenbusch and M. Hansen can consider that the *polis* was normally not a "consumer city" occupied by a small landed elite living on rents drawn from a mass of peasants, the latter being defined by their lack of political ability to take collective action and remedy their situation. Rather, the *polis* was typically inhabited by smallholding citizen farmers (*Ackerbürger,* to use M. Weber's term, perhaps to be translated as "farmer-burghers"), who commuted to their holdings (within three hours walking distance from the center: compare figs. 9.2, 9.3, 17.1, 18.2).[52] This arrangement would allow the effective management of dispersed holdings, which were a response to risk but also the consequence of egalitarian inheritance practices. The ancient Greek city-state, on this view, looks radically different from the medieval Italian commune constituted by the domination of the rural *contado* by the urban center.[53] The urban concentration of the majority of the population of most *poleis* would explain the importance of institutional politics conducted in the urban center by and for the citizen population, which could directly participate in state processes. The democratic tendency of the *polis* could be explained by nucleated settlement: the mass of citizens making its presence felt, acceding to political

power, using it to shape institutions and ideology in the *polis*, and retaining it in spite of oligarchizing reactions. Additionally, the concentration of many non-elite farmers in the urban center would have perpetuated democratic regimes, by continuously hindering, through regulation and redistribution, the creation of large fortunes.

However, this view of a "good *polis*" nucleated on an urban center where political power was exercised by the citizen community calls for a series of qualifications or nuances.[54] Hansen's elaborate model, complete with quantitative speculation, of a *polis* population largely concentrated in the urban settlement rests on shaky empirical grounds, namely, the supposed absence of dispersed rural settlement in survey archaeology (which has recently been challenged on methodological grounds), [55] as well an array of literary sources (which are inconclusive and impressionistic). Hansen's image seems unsuitable for Priēnē, for a number of reasons. First, the townhouses have no trace of working, storage, and manuring facilities (unlike the fourth-century BCE houses at Halieis in the southern Argolid). Second, the *polis* controlled a complex territory over a plain and a mountain (both sides) with secondary settlements,[56] subordinate villages of Plainsmen and perhaps even isolated farms that might have provided the rag-tag militia led by a Prienian in parallel with the formally mobilized citizen soldiers to fight against Celtic invaders.[57] This territory does not seem to be easily understood as a concentrated settlement of farmer-burghers.

Was even every small island *polis* organized along Hansen's model? This might have been the case of Hērakleia, on its island. On the other hand, I find it difficult to imagine a rich island such as Siphnos (with its 74 square kilometers) exclusively exploited out of the small urban settlement at Kastro (fig. 5.6).[58] Likewise, the territory of Siphnos's poorer, smaller (29 square kilometers) but rugged neighbor Seriphos is unlikely to have been exploited out of a single urban settlement perched high above the island's main harbor. Rather than reduce such territories to simple questions of size (as if the urban settlement were a point in the center of a circle with a radius of 5 kilometers, or 12, or whatever), we might conceive of complexity and irregularity even at a small scale. Many examples bear out a model of territorial complexity. A well-documented case is the *polis* of Kyaneai in Central Lykia, covering a territory of 136 square kilometers (at this point it is better to banish any thought of a circle with a radius of 6.58 kilometers). It is clear that the Yavu plateau, occupied by Kyaneai, was saturated with secondary settlements, villages, and especially farms, where the majority of the citizen population probably resided. Indeed, the multiplication of rural establishments is concomitant with the formation of the *polis* in the Yavu plateau and in Lykia generally.[59] Another example from Asia Minor is the foundation of Aphrodisias in Karia that was accompanied by a dense occupation of the valley within which the city was located.[60] Further up in the highlands of Karia, it is likely that the *polis* of Amyzōn had no urban center at all, but rather an important monumentalized shrine where the citizens periodically met. This dispersed population presumably occupied farmsteads and villages in Mount Latmos (one of them seceded during the second century BCE, which suggests distance and centrifugal tendencies).[61]

In mainland Grece, the territory of the small *polis* of Halieis was densely occupied, during the fifth and especially the fourth century BCE, with farmsteads of very diverse types; a secondary settlement and two clusters of farms were permanent settlements situated outside the immediate hinterland of the city.[62] Even the landscape of fourth-century BCE Attica was not simply divided into small nucleated settlements replicating the big central settlement, but occupied with a diversity of solutions, including loose villages, polycentric microregions, hamlets, and farmsteads.[63] Without trying to quantify and generalize, as Hansen does, I consider it likely that some degree of rural residency was a widespread phenomenon. This is not to argue in favor of the "consumer city" as the dominant model. Rather, structuration of the territory, notably through the extension of civic society to rural space, was the crucial element of *polis* life, and that this required political work, tensions, and the risk of power imbalance; in other words, the relationship of town and country remained a *problem*.

The risk was particularly present because of the emergence of large *polis* territories through synoikism, with secondary settlements included within them (above, chapter 10). The phenomenon was a development of the older phenomenon of complex civic territories with secondary settlements, as can be seen at Priēnē (above) or Teōs, which in the fifth century BCE controlled three secondary settlements—Aroiē, "the fort," and "the island" (perhaps Myonessos, modern Üçgen Adası, 18 kilometers from the urban center).[64] By the late second century BCE, the territory of Teōs (fig. 9.2; perhaps 135 square kilometers) included up to five earlier *poleis* (Airai, Oroanna, Kyrbissos, and one or two more cities, as well as villages or farmsteads in the mountainous hinterlands).[65] Likewise, the *polis* of Aigai absorbed all the settlements in the Aiolian mountain (the modern Yünt-Dağ: fig. 17.2).[66]

On a larger scale, the territory of some city-states covered vast geographies across land and sea. The *polis* of Rhodes included not just the island itself, but a continental territory and a cluster of small islands, whose inhabitants were admitted to the citizen body.[67] One of these islands was Tēlos, which we have seen earlier as a striking example of negotiation between elite and *dēmos* during the "great convergence" of the fourth century BCE (above, p. 219), before its absorption by its big neighbor. At Milētos, the large number of citizens receiving a gift of grain in 160 BCE (perhaps 9,000 men) hints at the enfranchisement of the population of settlements absorbed by the *polis*, namely the mountain community of Pēdasa, once a *polis* but taken over by Milētos in the early second century BCE, and the "Milesian islands." The communities annexed by the *polis* of Milētos made up a great continental and maritime "territory."[68]

Under a "good *polis*" model, we would not hesitate to consider rural populations as well integrated in *polis* structures, through "Kleisthenic" institutions, and simply through direct participation of individuals in *polis* life. The elites of the Rhodian continental and maritime territories participated enthusiastically as semi-voluntary

contributors (*leitourgoi*) and priests in the festival life of the urban center of the *polis*.[69] In Roman Asia Minor, we have seen rural settlements producing citizens who held office in the urban center. Such settlements were often officially integrated within the structures of civic society (above, chapters 13 and 15), as subdivisions of the citizen body and *polis* territory. In any case, many villages appear endowed with *polis*-like institutions to enable decision-making and produce public goods.

Yet, as we have seen when discussing power imbalances (above, chapter 18), the issues of the relationship between urban center and secondary settlements or dispersed farmsteads remained problematic, especially as concerns access to the political institutions located in the urban center, the connective ties of civic society, and the public goods managed by the *polis*.[70] Even on Ruschenbusch's or Hansen's optimistic "normal" models, in the best of cases, up to a third of the citizens resided in farms or villages in the territory. How often did they attend the Assembly, hold office, go to court, receive distributions or compensation? The poor hunter represented in Cocceianus Diōn's fantasy set around a Euboian *polis* (*Oration* 7) encounters the *polis* rarely—receiving a distribution of cash once during a visit to town, and another time getting involved in a full-blown Assembly meeting. What about the inhabitants of settlements absorbed by other *poleis*, for instance within the territory of Aigai or Teōs?

Subordination of those with diminished access to the center remained a possibility. The subjection of the countryside and its populations was present at the emergence of the *polis* (above, chapter 6) in many regions; for instance, the "Dustyfeet" of early Epidauros are likely a subordinate rural group, as Plutarch writes, rather than farmer-citizens commuting back to the urban center (as Hansen fondly supposes).[71] The relationship did not need to be named with a formal title: when Hērakleia under Latmos, in Karia, was shaken by a series of calamities (an earthquake and war ca. 200 BCE), its "villages and settlers" (*dēmoi kai oikētai*) ran away, perhaps serfs comparable to the Plainsmen of nearby Priēnē, or perhaps simply peasants in a relationship of economic inferiority to the city. In some *poleis* of Lykia, a class of *paroikoi*, "dwellers-by," seems to designate free, locally born residents who did not have access to full citizenship, as possibly implied by a recently published inscription from first-century BCE Xanthos mentioning citizens, *metoikoi*, and *paroikoi* as the free population of the *polis*.[72] Earlier, in Limyra, "*paroikoi* who have settled in the city" are mentioned, which seems to confirm the existence of second-class citizens in the countryside (and also their occasional migration to the urban center, where they existed as an undigested group, perhaps constantly renewed like rural immigrants to the cities of early modern Europe).

The appearance of differentiated classes of citizenship in some Roman-era *poleis*, or the use of the ethnikon or the marker "of the citizens" in official documents within *polis* territories (above, p. 342) might point to an evolution by which the urban citizens, precisely because they monopolized access to institutions and public

goods, evolved into first-class citizens distinct from the rural, free, originally citizen, population. This rural population would have ended up occupying a position structurally similar to the *paroikoi* in Lykian cities. The situation might be comparable to early-modern Geneva, with its territory of 89 square kilometers for a population of 31,000 inhabitants, divided between an urban population of 20,000 and a rural population of 10,000. In the autonomous Genevese city-state, an elite of some four hundred *citoyens* enjoyed access to office and participation, whereas *bourgeois* only had the right to vote, a right denied the locally born *natifs* and immigrant *habitants*, let alone the peasantry of the countryside. This modern parallel allows us to wonder if, in the long history of the *polis*, the urban population's relationship with the rural populations was often an unhappy one, between the complex work of integration and the temptation of exclusion and subordination.[73] Even without formal subordination, the stark facility with which the inhabitants of the city ended up in possession of the harvest of the denizens of the countryside, as witnessed by Galen (with no comment on the mechanisms involved), acts as a reminder of the imbalance between town and country in the *polis*:

> Those who live in the cities, in accordance with their universal practice of collecting as soon as summer was over a sufficient supply of corn for the whole following year, took from the fields all the wheat, with the barley, beans and lentils, and left to the rustics only those leguminous products which are called starches (*ospria*) and pulses (*chedropa*), after they had taken away a good part of these to the city. So the people in the countryside, after consuming during the winter what had been left, were compelled to resort to unwholesome foodstuffs, through the spring, eating twigs and shoots of trees and bushes, bulbs and roots of unwholesome plants, and they fell upon the so-called wild vegetables, whatever one could get hold of, to the point of satiety; they ate them after boiling them whole like green grasses, of which they had not tasted before even as an experiment.[74]

Galen continues with a clinical description of the physiological damage inflicted by this diet, which he presumably witnessed during his rambles in the hinterland of his city, the *polis* of the Pergamenians, *mētropolis* of Asia, thrice-Temple Warden.

The Shapes and Proportions of Exclusion

It is impossible to quantify accurately and truthfully the distribution between the various categories in the population of any *polis*, even if ancient cities may have kept records for military or fiscal reasons.[75] In the case of Athens, it is plausible (if ultimately something of an educated guess) to propose figures as high as 60,000 adult male citizens after decades of imperial prosperity in the fifth century BCE, out of a total population of around 320,000 (if we were to count a total population

of 240,000 inhabitants of citizen status, 30,000 resident strangers and 50,000 slaves), so that the *polis* was institutionally in the hands of an in-group of around 19 percent of the population. In the fourth century BCE, the adult male citizens perhaps dropped to 30,000, out of a citizen group of over 120,000, and a total population of (say) 200,000 (including 30,000 resident strangers and 40,000 slaves); the in-group of adult male citizens would have made up 15 percent of the total population.[76] It is unnecessary to specify that these figures are completely approximative, with no real parameters for slaves and foreigners; their point is to think about possible proportions.

In contrast, Sparta, a closed polity based on serf labor and leading a federal structure, would have been ruled by a fully enfranchised citizen group of 8,000 in the early fifth century BCE (judging by the numbers of Spartiate men-at-arms in battle, to which a number of old or disabled citizens should be added): if the total population of the Spartan entity (including populous Messenia) added up to (say) 300,000, the ruling group of adult male Spartiates would have amounted to less than 3 percent.[77] But such calculations are complicated by the fact that many communities in the Spartan entity were subordinate "perioikic" *poleis*, and by the increasing presence of disfranchised Spartiates, marginal groups, and enfranchised helots: how do we quantify the Spartan system with its concentric circles of power? After the loss of Messenia in 371 BCE, and the gradual amputation of Spartan territory, the process of concentration of wealth and exclusion of the poor continued in the city of Sparta, complicating any attempt to calculate the size of the elite in-group.

What might the proportions have looked like for a less extensive *polis*? There are no solid indications, so what follows is mere speculation. At a much smaller scale, the island *polis* of Hērakleia must have had a few hundred inhabitants—but how many exactly? It is true that in the nineteenth century the figure was around forty tenants and their families (207 inhabitants in 1879) but (as suggested above, chapter 1) this may reflect the peculiar conditions of abandonment because of pirate raids, followed by underdevelopment because of an oppressive regime of sharecropping (at 50 percent!) to the benefit of an absentee landlord, the monastery of Panagia Chozoviotissa on Amorgos, or lessors.[78] The situation may have had a long-lasting impact (the island had a mere 286 inhabitants in 1928). But if we are willing to suppose that the collective action efforts of the citizenry were successful and made a life in common not just sustainable but prosperous, without a feudal-style landlord taking the surplus, could we imagine (say) 500 inhabitants, of which over 100 were adult male citizens? For what it is worth, the German archaeologist L. Ross thought the spring at the high point of the island could easily sustain around a hundred families.[79]

Priēnē, ca. 270 BCE, might have had 1,000 adult male citizens, busy with politics and the numerous offices required by the *polis*'s institutions.[80] Many of these probably resided in the urban site and its 500 or so townhouses, though, as I argued

above, a (substantial?) proportion of citizens must have lived in smaller settlements at Priēnē's harbor town, fortified places in the territory or perhaps even farmsteads on the northern side of Mount Mykalē (fig 1.5; though survey archaeology has revealed nothing).[81] But what number of slaves lived in the *polis*? What number of resident foreigners and freedmen? How many slaves worked in the citizens' fields?[82] Most importantly, what was the number of Plainsmen subordinate to the *polis*, and of the later *paroikoi*? As a thought experiment, we might people the beautiful city and its territory with 1,000 free adult women, 1,000 free children and elderly people of both sexes, 1,200 slaves, 300 resident foreigners, and 2,500 subordinate peasants of all ages, whose status contrasted with the adult male citizens. On this model, the citizen population of 1,000 men amounted to around 14 percent of the total population of 7,000 individuals living within the whole territory of the *polis*.

In the case of another small city, it is interesting to note that the small *polis* of Akraiphia had a population of resident foreigners (*pedawoikoi*). Dozens of these were granted the same fiscal situation as that of citizens, *isotelia*, in reward for their service in war (seventeen names survive, but the inscribed stone bearing the list is fragmentary). If we were to assume that a total of fifty-odd *pedawoikoi* were inscribed on the document (perfectly possible), that these were merely the most enthusiastic participants in the defense of Akraiphia (and hence that, for example, another twenty foreigners sat out the conflict or were not rewarded), we would have a population of seventy resident foreigners (and their families)—but out of what total population? The city was able to provide around twenty conscripts a year for the Boiotian federal army during the third and early second centuries BCE, which suggests a population of 700 adult male citizens—around 20 to 23 percent of a total population, which we could put at 3,000 to 3,500 across the whole territory.[83]

We could continue these experiments, looking for testcases and examples. For instance, for a large island *polis* such as Naxos or Thasos—this whole book abounds in *poleis* that we could try to see on the ground, rather than as examples of broad historical evolutions. None of these exercises is securely based, because of the absence of quantitative records, especially as concerns the question of numbers of slaves and foreigners. Nor is it quite clear what the significance is of often large figures for voters known to have attended assembly meetings in *poleis* of western Asia Minor (above, p. 240). It is true that they number in the thousands of citizens, and I used such figures to speak of democratic *poleis* in the great convergence; yet we do not know what the figures mean without a sense of the size and the structure of the rest of the population across the whole *polis*. For all the treasures of ingenuity and effort deployed to overcome the limitations in our evidence, the risk is that we have long moved from a subjunctive history to a subjective one.

In spite of the disparity between the very big *poleis* and the smallest ones, the proportions might have been roughly similar across the spectrum, namely an

institutionally empowered group of adult male citizens making up about 15 to 20 percent of the total population (and a larger citizen group including children and women—perhaps amounting to rather less than half of the total population within *polis* boundaries). Rather than a tiny elite, the body of citizens in most *poleis* may have represented a sizable, highly conscious and privileged minority group constituted by inclusion and exclusion. An interesting comparison comes from the north Italian communes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In these city-states, the class of well-to-do mounted citizen cavalry (*milites*) may have constituted 10 to 15 percent of the whole urban population, which implies a large adult male citizen population (amounting to a majority of the male population in the city). The subordinate countryside has to be taken into account and dilutes the proportion of citizens against the total population of the city-state without, however, amounting to domination by a narrow oligarchy.[84]

Exclusion and Domination in the History of the *Polis*

The picture above is a composite (like so much in the last part of this book), structured by the duality of citizenship and exclusion. More specifically, adult male citizen selfhood occupies its center, and is surrounded by the excluded—childish incomplete citizens, women entailed to perpetual juniority, enslaved manstock, resident foreigners with duties but no rights, rural *paroikoi* enjoying free-born citizen status but laboring under informal or institutionalized inferiorities. The principle of polar opposites that structuralist historians (the "Paris School") have seen as a cardinal phenomenon in ancient Greek culture, rehearsed the centrality of adult male citizen status, which is constitutive of the *polis*.[85] In C. Hedrick's striking reading of the Aristotelian model, the citizen lies at the zero-degree point of the *polis* as society.[86] The funerary reliefs showing a feasting scene (*Totenmahlreliefs*), as illustrated by a large and lavish example from an Ionian *polis* (fig. 9.1), can be reread in the light of the centrality of the adult male citizen. This figure occupies the literal center of the composition, reclining on a couch, the food laid out before him, holding silverware in both hands—an image of privilege; indeed, the visual trope is borrowed from representations of gods and heroes shown on votive reliefs as feasting in a reclined position, as they receive worshippers. The religious overtones are fitting for the funerary context and allude to the heroization of the dead (as do the horse head, the snake arching over the male figure's head to drink out of the bowl in his left hand, and the shrine-like architectural frame), but it is telling that they are deployed specifically and exclusively for the male figure. He is the only one to recline at the feast; he is surrounded by, and towers over, the stratified world of the household—a free woman sitting by the diner's couch, a free young man sitting at his feet, and the enslaved serving boy standing by the mixing bowl. We have seen that the couch is the usual furniture for the men's gathering in the *symposion* that was an important part of the *polis*, to the point that the whole of Priēnē's

urban fabric could be said to be generated by the size and positioning of the couch (above, p. 425); here it is repurposed hierarchically for a family scene, to speak of patriarchal domination. Perhaps the *andrōn*, the men's dining room, did fulfill this telling dual role in real life—as the setting for the men's gathering that was a constituent part of the *polis*, and as the scene of family dinners in which the head of the household presided over women, children, and slaves, performing their different relations to him. Behind the reclining adult male appear his weapons emphasized by a frame and reminding us of his role as participant in the political community, and his entitlements as a citizen. The normative representation of household hierarchy, private luxury, and service as a man-at-arms is a final reminder of the exclusionary processes of class and leisure as a condition for participation in the *polis*.

All the *polis*'s bads, in the manifestations described above (violence, patriarchy, enslavement, exclusion) were interconnected in a cat's cradle of analogies, correspondences, relations, paradoxes, and nuances woven around the citizen. These form an anti-civic society generated by the *polis* and complementing the civic society of groups and associations by which the *polis* made itself visible (above, pp. 428–33). Male slaves can be called *pais* ("boy"), which expresses the lack of status of the enslaved and the children alike—and both are exposed to the punitive violence and sexual aggression of the adult male citizen; however, the citizen future of the boy modulates the forms sexual activity can take in his case. Women are excluded and subject to deprivation, and hence steal food and alcohol, for which exercise they need cunning, like slaves. Women are victims of boundary-policing violence at the hands of the adult male citizens, like slaves. Yet they are also part of the citizen household, and hence play their role in reproducing slavery and the exclusion of foreigners; in contrast, prostitutes and slaves were assimilated as deprived of sexual honor and subject to the same outrages.[87] Free noncitizens in the city are outsiders: ex-slaves and unenfranchised country-folk could be called *paroikoi*, perhaps in the same cities; in other cities, ex-slaves were assimilated to resident foreigners.

If the citizen body can be naturalized as a descent group, and even conceived as having innate qualities and capabilities, the excluded can also be conceived as inherently disqualified from citizenship. Hence the conception of women as lacking in self-control and deliberative reason, or the notion that slaves (often imported from outside the Greek world) came from ethnic groups that were suitable for being ruled, and hence slaves by nature. Both of these ideas are set out in Aristotle's *Politics*, and it is not coincidental that this work, devoted to the ramifications of citizenship, starts by repeating and formalizing the principles of exclusion found in the *poleis*.[88] As we have seen, the situation with country-dwellers was complex, between outright exclusion, exploitation, and othering in the early *polis* and integration within the citizen body as full participants in the political community by the time of the great convergence; in any case, town-dwellers, elite and nonelite,

were deeply implicated in the countryside and its economic activities, be it as estate owners or as smallholders. At the same time, images of rural dwellers as either idealized, nonpolitical beings (exemplified by Dio's hunter), or comic, boorish figures lacking in urbanity, or as antisocial, profit-driven, selfish actors (exemplified by characters in Aristophanes's comedy, for instance in his *Acharnians*: above, p. 455), try to cast them as noncitizens, ostensibly not because of their residence but because of their nature and character.[89] The politics of negative images of rural populations is made clear by similar sentiments in the medieval city, where they were undoubtedly hardened by the urban domination over the countryside and hostility toward the poor: concepts of the public good and civic participation were defined against the figure of the peasant, imagined as incapable of disinterested and virtuous civic behavior.[90] Concepts of the public good, as we have seen, can exclude as well as unite, dominate as well as inspire.

This baroque intertwining of negative aspects of exclusion represents a final set of consequences of the Aristotelian definition of *polis* and *politeia*. Such costs are adumbrated in the dilemma of extension and access. If the *polis* is considered as a political community of participation by full members engaged in an ennobling common project (as H. Arendt imagined the *polis*), mobilized by solidaristic ideologies, and committed to moralizing ideals, there are two possibilities for the construction of the citizen body. The first is to try to widely empower inhabitants, in spite of multiple inequalities, to participate in the *polis*, a choice that requires much political work (notably in terms of institutional design) and pooled resources. The second is to exclude those who are unable to participate for various reasons: physical distance or, more insidiously, proclaimed defects such as lack of moral virtue or unsuitedness on account of economic disadvantages, the first often being used as an ideological cover for the second and enabled by moralizing virtue politics. This second solution is a temptation echoed in the latter parts of Aristotle's *Politics*. In Aristotle's wake, H. Arendt sensed this potential path when she viewed slavery as a solution to the dichotomy between mere labor and political work, namely the shunting-off of labor onto a specialized group.[91] The dilemma is inherent to *polis*-hood.[92]

The inherence of the ideology of exclusion explains its constant presence in the history of the *polis*. Enslaved labor probably played an important role in enabling the wealth and the lifestyle of the Early Iron Age elites, hence encouraging expansion and settlement in areas where metals and enslaved individuals could be acquired, in the western Mediterranean, the northern Aegean, the coasts of western and southern Asia Minor. Slavery is present at this formative phase, for instance in fostering group solidarity among acquisitive settlers, or in creating social difference between elite groups (enjoying access to metals, imported goods, and slaves) and local non-elite producers. The subsequent political problems would have to be solved through collective negotiation, leading to the community clusters that preceded the *polis*. In the early history of the *polis*, the construction of citizenship and

a citizen group defined by political equality was accompanied by the definition of the household, the othering of women, the rise of chattel slavery, the simultaneous appearance of prostitution and elite pederasty,[93] and debates about the position of strangers and rural populations within the *polis*. Citizenship, the market, and the presence of strangers both in the *polis* and on the margins, all interacted in creating and defining the conditions of *polis* life.

The rest of the narrative of *polis* history can also be written as the history of exclusion. The pervasiveness of chattel slavery, especially among the "open," democratic polities, offered a powerful metaphor through which hegemony could be conceptualized—and rejected as beyond the pale for communities of free and equal men. This ideological move means that the existence of slavery contributed not just to the definition of the citizen, but also to the vigorous ideal of *polis* autonomy. I have argued that the latter played a central role in the great convergence of *polis* forms, in disqualifying imperialism amongst *poleis*, and in encouraging resistance and agency in the face of supra-*polis* powers, such as the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman empire. The invention, extension, and instrumentalization of *polis* nativism (and its corollary of exclusion) is part of the great convergence in *polis* forms. Nativism acted as a medium for democratization, inclusion, and peer-polity interaction, and is prolonged into the Roman-era *polis* as a proxy for autonomy and a justification for democracy.

The diffusion of chattel slavery (rather than serfdom) is equally part of the great convergence, and the spread at various times of *polis* forms into landscapes of slavery such as Thessaly, Mysia, Bithynia, Phrygia, the Levant, or Thrace must have complicated the trade in enslaved humans. Did the adoption of *polis* forms by local communities act as a defense against enslavement of local populations, or on the contrary facilitate it by giving enslaving local elites a cultural form (Hellenization) and an institutional form that allowed them to interact with their peer *poleis*? At any rate, the exportation of injustice and exploitation outside the boundaries of the citizen body was a corollary of *polis* solidarity, visible in the resort to chattel slavery but also the creation of subordinate hinterlands, as in the case of Rhodes but also Mytilēnē or Byzantion.[94] These maritime cities controlled continental hinterlands, but the same temptation to subordinate the countryside is present in landlocked cities with big territories, and we have seen the dilemmas posed by the unfinished integration of secondary settlements after the wave of *synoikismoi* during the great convergence, and the occasional appearance of *paroikoi* and second-class citizenry in the Roman-era *poleis* (above, p. 516).

Finally, if exclusion was inherent to the *polis* as form, the practices and ideology of exclusion and othering must have been part of the diffusion of the *polis*, alongside the political culture of institutions and social relations between mass and elite. This is suggested by details such as the citizens of Julia Gordos (on the eastern edges of Lydia) honoring a citizen in 75/6 CE for good civic behavior but also for having lived "the life of a household master," *oikodespotēn bion*, or the repression

of prostitution and *kinaideia* (men as passive partners during penetrative sexual intercourse) in second-century CE Tralleis.[95] The contrast drawn between the "shamelessness" of "those who cannot hide that they suffered unspoken violence" and the ancestral restraint of the *dēmos* as it protects its shrines and its gymnasia, coheres with the classical regimen of citizenship, sexuality, and the body, seen in the case of Classical Athens. The same sexual protocols also occur at Beroia, in second-century BCE Macedonia, where the *gymnasion* was forbidden to artisans, madmen, and male prostitutes, and where the segregation of young boys from older adolescents may have to do with the control of sexual aggression and the management of the citizen body.[96]

For cases such as second-century BCE Beroia, first-century CE Julia Gordos, or second-century CE Tralleis, there is no unbroken chain of evidence of transmission of values from fourth-century BCE Athens, but rather the suggestion of a strong cultural constraint that can only come from the ideology of the *polis*. Values and ideology came alongside the institutional set-up of citizenship and exclusion. It is tempting to view the visual culture of the new *poleis* of the Roman Near East and Egypt, especially funerary imagery, as reflecting a version of the *polis* ideology centered on the citizen. At Palmyra, the representation of women bedecked with jewelry, rather than expressing some timeless luxury or enduring native identity (I have come close to suggesting this: p. 436, fig. 14.8, cf. fig. 15.3), might convey the wealth of the household and the role of entitled women in transmitting this wealth, and hence reproducing households. This applies especially to the elite households whose fortune was tapped by taxation, *leitourgia*, and benefactions to produce public goods, a political economy that is well attested at Palmyra.[97]

Distorting Effects

If we see the social history of the *polis* as shaped by the gravitational field of citizenship, arraying other relations around it in an "anti-civic" space, the activities of noncitizen actors, for all their diversity (see above, chapter 15), were subject to constant distorting effects rather than amounting to autonomous spaces of diversity, fluidity, and agency that might have constituted the "real" *polis*. This holds true in spite of the operation of multiple statuses, diversities, forms of immigration and settlement, zones of negotiation between the privileged and the marginalized, possibilities for self-affirmation by noncitizen groups, and the occasional public visibility and activity of women (as can be seen, for instance, in fourth-century BCE Athens, or Hellenistic Rhodes, or the cities of Roman-era Asia Minor).[98] The main intent and effect of the *polis* as institutions remained the concentration of benefits on the entitled in-group, and the shifting of costs onto the excluded, the enslaved, and the outsiders through violence, exploitation, or rent-seeking.

Concomitantly, the basic lack of access to the full package of rights and privileges that came with citizenship necessarily generated vulnerability and precarity,

in different forms for transient foreigners, resident foreigners (dependent on citizen patrons and liable to special fees as well as duties to the citizen commonwealth), and the enslaved and ex-enslaved. The vulnerability must have been exacerbated when the categories of exclusion and subordination intersected, for instance for enslaved foreign women or children.[99] The provisions for ex-slaves guarantee their freedom against seizure, but conditionally. Freedmen and freedwomen must continue to contribute labor to their former enslavers on terms, owe them deference, and their freedom from seizure is guaranteed by the intervention of citizen volunteer prosecutors—that is, dependent on the willingness of the community of the free to intervene for them. The threat of re-enslavement must have been a real possibility, as shown by Athenian law, where this terrible fate is the penalty inflicted on freedmen who neglect their duties to their former enslavers, along with foreigners who impersonate citizens.[100]

Even if women of all statuses did work for a living, they did so under heavy burdens—the enslaved and the freed having to surrender at least a proportion of their earnings and their work as rent; the free laboring under the costs of social disapproval, limited opportunities, the weight of gender norms and expectations, and lack of access to credit and institutions. They were potentially condemned to what S. Ogilvie (in the context of female work in early modern Germany) calls a "bitter living"[101] through lack of access to the institutions that protected adult male citizens from exploitation and lowered their transaction costs (above, chapter 17).

Conversely, the in-group of citizens could treat the excluded (the enslaved, the women, the strangers, the disenfranchised rural populations when present), like so much else in their world, as occasions to make profits and levy rent—as a form of stock. This (definitely non-Kantian and horribly non-Rawlsian) outcome is one of the consequences of the new economic history of the Greek city (above, chapter 17), and of the export of inequality and exploitation to the margins of the *polis*. The view of the *polis* as a world where civic virtue and the rule of law ensured low transaction costs and prosperity for all—as visible during the third and second centuries BCE but also, I have argued in the wake of D. Engels, in the Roman-era *polis*—thus has to be reframed. The *polis* worked as a mixed regimen guaranteeing, for an in-group of citizens, rights and benefits (notably from public goods and redistribution) and allowing differential access to those rights for outsiders, who provided surplus to the in-group. Instead of a system where liturgies and euergetism allowed a wealth elite to exploit the poorer members of the political community (a possibility I explored above), the *polis* might have been a social pact between rich and poor members of the political community to share the spoils of membership, partly levied off the excluded and made to fructify within protected spaces.

The outsiders were not condemned to passivity, but their attempts at collective action, I have argued above, ended up reinforcing the order of the *polis*. Women acting as benefactresses and even officeholders, visible in the Roman-era city, exemplify not so much economic and political agency on the part of women, as their

role in promoting the visibility of elite households. They represent an attempt on the part of the elites to increase their influence in the competitive "tragedy of the elites" that constituted the political economy of the cities;[102] or indeed to try to escape this framework. Forms of associative life created a rich civil society (above, chapter 15), but when the subaltern spoke, we must wonder what practical influence their gatherings and decrees had in compensating for the inherent disadvantages of exclusion from the citizen group. Rather than represent a visible counterpower to citizen centrality, or an appropriation of *polis* discourse by excluded groups, the ubiquitous imitation of *polis* institutions throughout *polis* society reinforced the entitlement of the citizens, notably by rehearsing the hegemony of *polis* ideology and reaffirming the *polis*'s claim to morality as embodied in civic participation, public-mindedness and recognition (above, chapter 16).

For instance, a Rhodian association of foreigners and slaves honored one of its members with praise and a crown for fortitude when contracted to remove the corpse of a doctor and burying it (perhaps during an epidemic) and making sure by his persistence and his courage in the face of personal enmities (*apechtheia*) that members of the association paid their dues and debts. The monumental inscription, the fine civic language, and the homage it pays to brave Chrysippos, houseborn slave of Merops, truly reaffirm the positive contents of civic discourse. Yet this statement cannot undo the absence of citizen status for all the actors involved. They can only try to claim a citizen-like dignity that *polis* institutions deny them but whose valence the Rhodian association of slaves accepts and desires.[103]

Spaces for agency (as in civil associative life) or negotiation (as in festivals or venues for the enslaved to bargain for better conditions) reinforced the world that the adult male citizens made.[104] Often the subaltern are left to celebrate their hard work and skill, or faithfulness to masters—that is, values reinforcing the *status quo*. The fifth-century BCE epitaph of Mannēs, a Phrygian, perhaps a denizen of an informal settlement of Anatolian workers in Attica, shows his pride in his work—"By Zeus, I never saw a better lumberjack than myself"—but also records his death as a victim of the Peloponnesian War, in whose outbreak he had no say.[105] In reaction, marginal cultural forms tried to give space for other voices than those assigned to the subaltern by the order of the *polis*. The tales concerning the biography of a fictional slave, Aisōpos, show an ugly, disfavored individual, whose sharp wits afford him agency in his relations with his dull master. The stories are preserved in mostly Roman-era versions, but go back to the early fifth century BCE. When runaway slaves created their own maroon society on third-century BCE Chios, under the leadership of one Drimakos, they organized it as a monarchy rather than along the lines of the participatory democracies from which they had only known exclusion and bitter exploitation.[106]

The articulation of ethical stances distinct from the moral and political economy of the *polis* points to the limits of the reach of *polis* institutions and civic society. In addition to the subaltern discourses mentioned above, one particular example is

the elaboration of bodies of moral thought that we see happening within rabbinical Judaism or early Christianity, on the margins of the *polis* world and its harshness.[107] Likewise, the emergence of highly sophisticated literate cultures in non-Greek languages such as Syriac or Coptic, in conjunction with the spread of Christianity and generally of new debates about the supernatural and the self-fashioning of humans in their relations with both the supernatural and human communities, are developments that happen away from the communitarian, moralizing discourses and contexts of the *polis*.[108] Though the *polis* played a major role in reshaping the Roman Near East, the social and cultural histories of the Near East in Late Antiquity show the limits of civic culture, as was already noticed by A. H. M. Jones when he somberly concluded his survey of "the achievement of the cities" (below).

One function that associations could have fulfilled was to try to elicit patronage, and hence find access to institutional processes through personal connections with members of the group of citizens—that is, precisely the sort of hierarchical, unequal, and noninstitutional processes that the *polis* discouraged among its own members. These may have existed in spite of civic ideologies (above, chapter 18), but would particularly have operated in the margins of the *polis*. Such processes might have been favored by members of the wealth elite, in spaces where democratic institutions had a weak reach (as I speculated above), to try to achieve social power. Disadvantaged individuals could try to hustle their way to profit from patronage and ultimately to gain access to the protections of civic status, as illustrated by the case of the prostitute Neaira (enslaved since childhood but managing to buy her manumission) and her progress within fourth-century BCE Athenian society. Neaira's story receives a lurid retelling in a piece of surviving forensic oratory from a court case against her, but can be reconstructed as the biography of one individual trying to work her way past the exclusionary structures of *polis* society.[109]

It has perhaps not been emphasized enough that the quest for patronage and protection, and hence privileged access to institutional advantage, necessarily generated competition among the excluded, thus perpetuating inequalities between individuals or groups, hindering any form of solidarity, and hence again reinforcing the *polis* order. This outcome is explicitly attested in third-century BCE Athens, at a time of renewed democracy and autonomy for the city: a travelogue (see above) comments on the difference between the *Athēnaioi*, citizens of Athens, generous and hospitable, and the *Attikoi*, noncitizen inhabitants of the area, who are suspicious, untrustworthy, and ill-intentioned. The difference is not natural or inherent, but due to the distorting effect of citizen status.[110]

Polis and Justice/Injustice

The political theorist E. Isin describes the city as a machine producing difference. In the case of the *polis,* difference was the basis for exclusion. Were exclusion, and the concomitant possibilities of domination, the *raison d'être* of the *polis*? If in their

own way oligarchies are communities of political deliberation and participation among their members (albeit often unstable, dwindling, and self-devouring), it is conversely true that even the most inclusive democratic *polis* is an oligarchy, in that it limits its inclusion and excludes the majority of its territory's inhabitants from membership and stakeholding, on fictitious grounds of descent rather than on economic criteria. This was applicable even to a small *polis* such as that of the island of Hērakleia, where the citizens felt entitled to take a public decision concerning "all the inhabitants."

The constitution of the in-group of stakeholders is predicated on their freedom; that is, their freedom from rule—but also their own freedom to rule, as noted in Aristotle's formal description of the *polis* throughout the *Politics*. As argued above (chapter 16), this foundational characteristic of citizenship manifests itself in participation in decision-making and dispute resolution—and in the wide distribution of actual "ruling" over equals in the form of office-holding, through the principles of collegiality, accountability, and rotation. But the freedom of citizens (their not-being-ruled) was reflected in their own ability to rule over others in their household: wives, children, the enslaved, the strangers (be they immigrants or "strangers within"). These were ruled in different ways but always permanently by the entitled members of the *polis*.

Hence propensity to rule was inherent to the *polis*. It is present in the early history of the *polis*, for instance in the closed polities that restricted citizenship to a small urban elite, undergirded economically by the labor of subordinate peasantry in the countryside, and politically by perioikic settlements or subject *poleis*. The new *poleis* founded by settlers (notably in the northern Aegean, the Black Sea region, the western Mediterranean, or northern Africa), which are an important part of the early development of the *polis* form, may have lived off the subordination of non-Greek, native populations by the Greek settlers, as proposed by G. Zuchtriegel (who studies closely the case of colonization during the fifth century BCE and specifically the case of Hērakleia in southern Italy).[111] An explicit link between the freedom of the enfranchised and the fact of ruling over others is given by the multiple senses of freedom in "Archaic" and Classical Sparta—control over a serf-like population, participation in politics, leisure to conduct political and military affairs, and (as a direct consequence) hegemony over others. The local imperialism of other *poleis* with subordinate populations in the northeast Peloponnese: Argos, Sikyōn, Epidauros, in Crete, or in Thessaly, probably rested on the same principles.[112]

The temptation to rule underlay the drive to hegemony that plagued the long history of the *polis*, culminating in a "Hundred Years' War," before developments in high political history ruled out this possibility. Down the centuries, the inherent association between *polis*-hood and rule over others explains why the *polis* form proved a reliable tool of large-scale statecraft and especially empire, as a linchpin of the reorganization of Macedonia under Philip II, as part of colonial rule by Hellenistic kingdoms (with whom it shared at least a linguistic and ethnic back-

ground), or as an extension of provincialization in the Roman Near East, where new *poleis* governed vast territories with the support and ultimately for the benefit of the Roman state (above, chapter 14).[113] J.-M. Bertrand boldly suggested that the *polis* of Priēnē ruled over the Plainsmen as proxies or representatives of supralocal imperial power, since the Achaimenids and Alexandros III levied tribute off the Plainsmen even as the latter were under Prienian control.[114] The *polis* was the serviceable tool for the subordination of populations that lost the support of supralocal empires, as in the case of the Jews, or of groups perceived as enemies of the established imperial order, such as Christians.[115] We have seen how the Roman-era *poleis* served enthusiastically as the enforcers of persecution against Christians, to gruesome effect.

In the Aristotelian ideal of the *polis*, the adult male citizen's capacity to rule over his household is linked with his capacity to participate, as a deliberating person, in politics—in decision-making, adjudication, temporary rule over other citizens, and control of the public goods produced for the commonwealth by extraction of revenue from the elite, economic transactions in the *polis* and common property. It is worth considering the relationship in the other direction. Participatory politics, namely shareholding in the enterprise of preserving freedom (from slave-like subjugation) and of creating a life in common (through public-mindedness and virtue politics), might have acted as alibis for domination, patriarchy, nativism, and enslavement, by proving the innate moral entitlement of the adult male born citizen to rule over others (women, foreigners, and the enslaved), to take their labor, and to treat them like stock. Of course, no culture is responsible for its subsequent reception, but it is at least suggestive that in early modern and modern North America, the slave-owning gentry of Virginia and the aristocracies of the Deep South claimed classical republicanism as a model, in which a small enfranchised elite enjoyed political rights while exploiting an enslaved and racialized workforce.[116]

Citizenship made domination possible, not just by rejecting domination and exploitation outside the circle of members, but by giving members an ideological justification for their power to exclude and to exploit: the "virtue politics" of the *polis* (above, chapter 16), apart from enforcing solidarity between rich and poor, also ensured their solidarity against outsiders. Participation in politics was conceived as natural to adult male citizens, the fulfillment of their human potential, the reflection of their public-minded character (as illustrated by civic discourse about good citizens). But it was participatory citizenship that entitled the husband of Lysistrata, in Aristophanes's play of the same name, to threaten her with violence at the moment when she tries to breach the separation: he broodingly returns from the Assembly, and ostentatiously—indeed violently—denies Lysistrata's right to find out what happened by raising a fist over her.

Putting a wife back in her place allows the adult male citizen to continue exploiting her labor in the household (notably for care and housework). Conversely, men's failure at politics threatens their entitlement and, in Aristophanes's topsy-turvy

fantasies (*Lysistrata, Assemblywomen*), opens the path to women's power. One way to consider the ritualized activity of politics, so visible throughout Athens as in other *poleis*, is as a theatrical demonstration of the entitlement to rule over others. More broadly, a great deal of civic culture seems to need the Other, often enslaved, as justification and as purpose. The "normal type" of the gravestone showing man and wife using civic tropes of restraint and order (fig. 10.4) might also have celebrated the right to rule and exploit the enslaved whose bodies show their lack of suitedness for the life of the free. Aristotle writes that dealing with slaves lacked anything heightened or inspiring (*semnon*), unlike the noble purposes (*kala*) of politics and civic activities.[117] The citizen slaveowner's dictum rings as a disconcerting echo to H. Arendt's definition of politics as ennobling work among citizens who participate in a collective, grand enterprise.

Citizenship had more practical applications. In Marx's and Engel's description, the *polis* as state was primarily directed against holding down the slaves.[118] This function also inflected the relationships between *poleis*: the peace between Hērakleia under Latmos and Milētos (above) drew on the resources of peer-polity interaction to allow the resumption of normal exploitation of the enslaved by curtailing their possibilities to escape and by returning escapees back to their enslavers. The skyline of island *poleis* with their solid, ashlar-built towers (Hērakleia, but especially Seriphos and Siphnos, give examples) might have reflected the security of slave-owning citizens, feeling justified in their rights by their membership of political communities.[119] In this interpretation, the decree of the Herakleiotes, in its commitment to find a political solution to conflict (and here we should be willing to take the document at face value, without looking for hidden dimensions of power), might have comforted the citizen stakeholders in their awareness that they exercised power in a reasoned, participatory way, that justified their power over the excluded—female, enslaved, foreign. As I suggested at the start of this chapter, the grounded yet sublime beauty of the city of Priēnē (figs. 1.5, 10.4, 19.1) might have communicated the entitlement of the citizens (as members of a community whose transcendent bigness was made visible through the built environment)—and hence their advantages over the excluded (including the rural inhabitants).[120]

One further function performed by political community as foundational exclusion might have been to solidify the social pact between elite and mass. In earlier chapters, we have seen this pact cemented by virtue politics and locked in by a delicate bargain involving economic inequality, political equality, rent-seeking and rent-limiting, property rights, and communal claims on individual property. The constantly enacted and proclaimed exclusion of others from membership in the city, and hence from the social pact of the *polis*, created practical advantages for the entitled, but also the shared ideological good of entitlement itself. One question we must ask is if citizenship, exclusion, and othering fulfilled the role of strengthening the power of the local elites within their *poleis*, through a sense of privileges shared between the rich and the poor, defined as a community against excluded others: this sense of

membership and solidarity might have been used by the elites to distract attention from rising economic inequalities and rent-seeking within the *polis*.

This function might have been all the more important with the end of armed conflict between the *poleis* (and hence the absence of external enemies to foster solidarity), and the increasing share of wealth seized by wealthy elites with the resources to participate in the economic growth that the good institutions of the *polis* fostered, especially once global connectivity supercharged exchanges in the Hellenistic period, then under the Roman empire. Such an analysis is clearly inspired by pessimistic views on modern politics in the ailing democracies of the developed world (especially the United States, where racial politics and culture wars have been instrumentalized by wealth elites and their political henchmen to obscure and distract from class conflict).[121] Does it help to understand the ancient Greek *polis*? In any case, it invites us to look for connections between the various social bads produced by the *polis*, in their complex connection with the latter's social goods.

Writing Histories of the *Polis*

What would the good *polis* look like? I have been tempted to point to the island world of Hērakleia, perhaps, as a community of citizens making conditions and solutions for the common life, or the spaces of the autonomous and democratic *polis* of Priēnē, if our gaze peoples them with citizens. We can imagine the citizens living in an urban center and solving common problems as part of a project of political freedom and equality. They appear to us working as free, property-holding members rather than as rent-producers for an elite; living an egalitarian political culture of citizen dignity, restraint, and solidarity around ideals of the public good; and exercising collective agency in interacting with other city-states and in resisting or bargaining with bigger imperial entities, thanks to force-multiplying peer-polity bonds and federal structures. Citizens do so by participating in effective democratic institutions and rules born of centuries of experimentation and diffusion, successfully constraining and embedding the wealthy within law and redistributive practice. These good institutions produce literal public goods that alleviate poverty in the *polis*. The *polis* works to channel the rational pursuit of interests within institutions that reinforced general welfare. Its prosperity comes from ideals and institutions; it is mostly based on free labor rather than slaves.

And what of the bad *polis*? In these last two chapters, I modeled the *polis* as inextricably bound with endemic bads: riven with violence upstream and downstream from political processes, a violent rather than restrained society; insidiously affected by elite power in controlling issues and outcomes; and foundationally based on mechanisms of exclusion (formal or informal), to the benefit of a privileged in-group of adult male citizens, an urban elite enjoying access to participation in state institutions, and benefitting from the protection that institutions generate. Bad *polis* is especially dependent on widespread enslaved labor at all levels of society.

We now can understand why the *polis* is so ready for complicity with imperial control and exploitation. This, too, could be a description of the island polity of Hērakleia (perhaps riven by conflict, controlled at a deep level by a small wealth elite, and dependent on enslaved labor for cash crops), or the *polis* of Priēnē, with its small citizen body, enslaved workers, and dependent countryside.

It is clear that the good *polis* is the result of a coherent set of relations between its various features: political ideals of equality and solidarity both facilitated and were reinforced by democratic institutions and the good economic institutions (for instance, by fostering trust and coordination). It is equally clear that the three great bads of the bad *polis* (violence, elite power, exclusion) were interconnected, dynamically but jaggedly. Violence was endemic as part of *polis* workings, generated by political processes; but it also existed because of the necessity to create and police the boundaries of exclusion, and was visited on the marginalized (women, enslaved people, and the freed, at least as threats). The prevalence of conflict among citizens may have made violence against the excluded more acceptable, a fortiori, but the endemic exercise of physical violence against the excluded might also have made citizens all the more ready for violence against each other. Such violence might have played an important part in the acquisitive power of great men. Furthermore, exclusion was foundational for solidarity among citizens, but also created the need for patronage among the excluded, and hence the conditions for informal elite power. The connections between violence, power, and exclusion were (perhaps unsurprisingly) marked by anomie and contradictions.

Good *polis* and bad *polis* coexisted, but what were their relations? A critical view of the *polis* is to view the good as directly founded on the bad, in relations of causal dependency. A. H. M Jones, at the end of his great survey of the post-Classical *polis*, ends with a despairing indictment (often forgotten nowadays) of the *polis*, an image of failure and tragedy, for not sharing the advantages of urban life and of civic institutions with those on its margins—the enslaved, the rural peasantry, the populations who did not have access to the codes of Greekness within which the *polis* expressed itself with such articulacy and force. The critique rests on a conviction of the importance and dignity of civic participation, and sorrow at their not being shared more widely (befittingly for the social-democrat Jones).[122]

More vigorously, N. Purcell, at the end of his groundbreaking essay on "mobility and the *polis*," delivered a sobering assessment:

> [t]he *polis* in general, we might say, was a cul-de-sac, an unhelpful response to the challenges of the Mediterranean reality, if building large and relatively harmonious and inclusive societies is considered a worthwhile goal.[123]

The essay appears in a volume edited by O. Murray and S. Price on the "archaic" and "classical" *polis* conceived as a prequel—a homage but also a methodological and theoretical challenge to A. H. M. Jones's treatment, which had appeared fifty years earlier. Murray and Price's volume is bookended by Purcell's essay and a paper

by W. Runciman, which echoes Purcell in calling the *polis* "an evolutionary dead-end," because its democratic institutions made it unfit to respond to the high-political challenges of the late fourth century BCE. This whole book has argued against this view and proposed an alternative scheme of the *polis*'s durability as a political and social form; but it still has to sail into the headwind of Purcell's daunting critique.

Critiques of the *polis* as injustice and violence are reminiscent of certain strictures formulated within liberal political philosophy. Especially relevant are political philosopher J. Shklar's protests at the blind spots of liberalism, because of abstraction (as in the case of J. Rawls's theory of justice), because of excessive faith in the power of "natural" social manifestations of community (as in the case of M. Walzer's shared understandings), or because of a willingness to accept the exclusionary costs of Aristotelian-style *polis* citizenship (as in the case of H. Arendt). All of these neglect the dimensions of suffering and injustice involved in actual instantiations of their political models. In the two latter cases, Shklar specifically excoriates romantic investment in the *polis* (in the form of a "quaint obsession with Athens"; the present book runs the risk of merely replacing Athens with the *polis* from the third century BCE to the third century CE as an object of obsession).[124]

A metaphor of a conception of "good *polis*" being based on or the same as "bad *polis*" might be found in a short story by science-fiction author Ursula Le Guin. In her "psychomyth" *The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas*, Le Guin presents a utopian city, whose perfect happiness is based on the mistreatment of one child, living an awful, squalid existence "in a basement under one of the beautiful public buildings of Omelas." All the adult citizens know of the child's existence, and that "their happiness, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skill of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery"; indeed, confronting this fact and viewing the degraded child are part of the privileged inhabitants' coming of age. But a minority chooses to leave the city rather than accept the foundation of their happiness and live with it.[125]

This metaphor for the *polis* remains, however, an image or emblem, however useful it is to help us start viewing the *polis* critically. Such a miserabilist metaphor is problematic in several ways. First, it might assign excessive causal force to contingencies and secondary complicities. The *polis* did not invent patriarchy, abuse, violence, sexual exploitation, enslavement, othering, disenfranchisement, which are world-historical phenomena (and are for instance visible in the pre-institutional, pre-*polis* world portrayed in the *Odyssey*, or in large empires such as the Achaimenid, or in extensive social organizations such as the Celtic warrior nations of Western Europe during the Iron Age). It is true that the *polis* was embroiled and complicit in these practices, in ways that reflected and affected the political structures of citizenship. My earlier survey argues that *polis* ideals and institutions were potentially transformational, explaining the history and the stability of the *polis* as a political

and social form. Here I have suggested that the conservative, consensual, communitarian nature of its ideology, and the pragmatic force of its institutionalist bargain (between *dēmos* dominance and elite persistence) all meant that the *polis* could not achieve any radical transcendence of its general world-historical context of gender inequality or enslavement. *Polis* ideology, institutions, and social rituals merely underlined the limited reach of social justice when distributed among a group of stakeholders, who would shape slavery and exclusion in the image of their world.

Second, as a metaphor, "bad *polis*" merely mirrors, in critical fashion, the self-satisfied and strategic imagination of the adult male citizens as the sole beneficiaries of a political community based on exclusion. It is a useful reminder of the violence and anomie that the utopian, stylized language of institutions leaves out; but its claims of dialectical connections between bad *polis* and good *polis* are complicated by the fictional nature of both. The realities of the *polis* might be less tragically simple, and the connection between goods and bads multiple and differential. This does not mean that we should reintroduce an image of the *polis* as ordered by multiple statuses or associative groups, an interpretation that I have argued against on institutional and Aristotelian grounds. But it does mean that the *polis* of institutions existed in close connection with another world, which took various forms. It appeared as the *polis*'s residue, its margin, its shadow, its double. It existed in the interstices and on the margins of public institutional workings. This is how I understand D. Kasimis's insight that the excluded, the stranger, is in fact intimately part of the *polis*, despite the nativist fictions that modern political theorists (such as M. Walzer) have agonized over.[126] But the presence of the stranger is often as a repressed or occluded presence, whose traces or even whose return we have to learn to see in the *polis*'s fictional shadow.

In practice, we can start by looking again at the parameters of the *polis* as form. Above, I sketched out three elements of the "good" *polis*: institutionalism (in the sense of good constitutional design), idealism (in the sense of a virtue politics of the public good), and interests (in the sense of an enduring solution to collective action problems). I have also explored three bads—endemic violence, elite "three-dimensional power," and exclusion and its consequences. The specific intensity of these six historical vectors, and their interaction, determine the history of the *polis* in general, but also the particular shape that any one *polis* took in the course of time, in relationship with larger causal factors that they influenced in turn. They also will have to be taken into account as part of social and cultural histories in which the *polis* form figures, because of the constitutive impact of its concerns (stateness, agency, the travails of integration, structuration between city and country, the relations between mass and elite).

Day to day, the structures of exclusion admitted of compromises and negotiations in the operations of the developed forms of the *polis*. The democratic ideal of dignity and its incompatibility with lordly violence, in spite of the divide between entitled citizen and non-enfranchised slave, percolated to concern all human deni-

zens of the *polis*, as shown by tentative protections given to the enslaved from wanton violence because of the attempt to limit outrageous violence and the sense of superiority it implied.[127] The effect is conveyed by vignettes from the fifth century BCE: the angry observation, in an antidemocratic pamphlet, that in Athens one cannot punch people in the street because he cannot tell free from slave; the rallying of enslaved laborers to the side of the people in the civil war on the island of Kerkyra, in the knowledge that rule by a small group of the wealthy was simply worse for everyone.[128] Democratic inclusiveness had general positive impacts on the *polis* (just as oligarchical exclusiveness ended up affecting negatively even the members of the small enfranchised circle). G. Kron senses that "the democratic social and political rights enjoyed by Greco-Roman citizens must surely have had innumerable subtle effects," in extending some degree of legal protection to the whole of *polis* society.[129]

Small decencies and gestures of humanity appear in *polis* culture. In late second-century BCE Priēnē, benefactors extended civic ritual (often in a private context) to foreigners, *paroikoi*, and slaves, reflecting a knowledge that these conditions were contingent rather than a reflection of inherent inferiority, thus rejecting Aristotelian "slavery by nature" as a constituent part of *polis* practice, if not necessarily of *polis* ideology. B. Gray has seen in these occasions and others (as documented especially in the civil decrees of the late second and first centuries BCE), a discovery of the possibility of *philanthrōpia*, love of humanity, in the *polis*, as the result of serious thought about the problems of exclusion and the possibility of remedying them without watering down civic participation and equality.[130] In the case of many decisions taken by the assembly of citizens affecting all the inhabitants (as already mentioned, as a reflection of exclusion and privilege), the professed motivation was concern for the welfare of the whole population, as in the case of Hērakleia where the citizens at least claimed to act for "the *koinon* of all those inhabiting the island." Just as citizen dignity, if conceived capaciously, extended beyond the limits of the citizen body, the ideal of the public good included *polis* as society. The citizen body in assembly could be animated with a sense of its representativeness and its responsibility—to the benefit of those citizens who could not attend, and generally of the non-enfranchised.

Finally, and most significantly, the citizen body might have been more porous than nativist ideology admitted. Even democratic, fifth-century BCE Athens, where the rule of bilateral citizen parentage was introduced as a condition for citizen birth, underwent such explosive demographic growth between 480 and 431 BCE that it is very likely that many strangers were admitted into citizen ranks, presumably from immigrants and freedmen.[131] The constant accusations of foreign descent among the Athenian elite might betray this open secret (to the point that E. Cohen has supposed that birth from two *resident* parents—*astoi* in the text of the citizenship law of 451 BCE—was sufficient for admission to the city body).[132] The story of Neaira, for all of its obscurities (due to the source, a vituperative court

speech) might reflect the porosity of the citizen body, policed by court cases and family feuds rather than systematic bureaucratic efforts, since these lay beyond the stately resources of the *polis*. The ideology of nativism, precisely because it was a fiction—usually expressed in mythological terms of distant descent from founding heroes or deities, rather than the historical concept of a documented group of settlers—could cover a much messier reality of informal acceptance and infra-institutional admission.

The performative nature of the mechanisms of admission to the citizen body may have favored this outcome. Acceptance into the small subdivisions that constituted "civic society" but also regulated citizen intake at birth depended on persuasive performance and uptake; so did participation in the *polis* rituals and institutions that made citizenship visible and were one of the perks of citizenship. The remote countryman portrayed by Cocceianus Diōn in his essay on *polis* life, the *Euboicus*, seems to have no problem in just showing up and receiving his share in a distribution in town (typical of the Roman-era *polis*), nor in taking part in an assembly meeting. His knowledge of himself as citizen is never questioned.[133] Had he in fact been the son of a freedman or immigrant, his track record of participation would have constituted overriding signs of his citizen status. The citizen body was hence constituted by democratic institutions and their performative power to create realities, and by the successful performance of citizen identity. The performative model of citizenship, proposed by A. Duplouy, offered a path of acceptance through fictions and consensus.[134]

The process might have taken place in large *poleis* (because of the sizable population and difficulty of keeping track, especially if there was movement within the *polis* and its territory);[135] but also in small *poleis*, the willingness of face-to-face communities to admit members whom they agreed upon. The sale of citizenship, attested occasionally, might have acted as a guaranteed admission to the civic body, in contrast with messier, more protracted processes, a fast-track or VIP solution. In these conditions, it is possible that immigrants or their descendants, or descendants of freedmen, or rural inhabitants moving to the urban center, succeeded in getting themselves absorbed into the citizen body.

All of these possibilities do not quite dispel the cloud of pessimism that overhangs this chapter. A fringe of small decencies did not change the way in which exclusion was woven into the fabric of the *polis*. In fact, decency might have veiled exclusion and hence made it more palatable for the victims. Professed concern on the part of the citizens for the welfare of the whole population of the *polis* was potentially self-serving and might have covered the distorting realities of power and violence wielded by the in-group of citizens—in other words, it might merely have been another of the alibis of "bad *polis*." The real possibility of a porous *polis* did not change the existence of institutions and laws, their distorting effect on the marginalized, and the necessity for hustling and patronage among the margins. Yet these pessimistic interpretations, in turn, are not the only possible ones: the social-

izing and humanizing effect of ideals might have created eddies and countereffects to the strict workings of institutions, the self-serving ideologies of the citizens, and the violent, exploitative pursuit of self-interest by the enfranchised. This set of interferences represents the practical interactions between the different parameters of "good" and "bad" *polis* I outlined above, and another complication to the project of writing the history of the *polis*.

A striking illustration of the return of the social within an Aristotelian history of the *polis* is provided by the site of Priēnē, with which we opened this book, and indeed which we have revisited repeatedly. Recent soundings on the northern edge of the site, at the foot of the cliff face of Tēlōneia, have revealed an astonishing fringe of workshops, rock-cut installations, and strikingly atypical ritual gestures. This occupation left evanescent traces that contrast with the solidly civic, aesthetically refined and unitary city laid out against the slope in an orthogonal rhythm of public spaces and private housing, and made of cut stone, images, and inscriptions, all of which present a familiar, even archetypal face of the *polis* (fig. 1.3).[136] Who the occupiers of the fringe zone were is unknown, as are the precise dating and duration of the occupation of the zone: was it a temporary occupation, an area of workshops and labor for the citizens, or a shadow of the *polis* inhabited by a marginal population? The unusual ritual offerings admit of different interpretations: is their anomaly connected to immigration or to spheres of activity not represented in the main urban center? After the present *voyage au bout de la nuit,* the anti-Aristotelian, messy fringe to the beautiful city adds yet another layer of complexity to the *polis* of Priēnē and to the history of the *polis* more generally.

Fringes might even exist at the center of the *polis*. As we have seen, an extraordinary decree from second-century CE Tralleis extols ancestral decorum (*kosmos*) and represses sexual disorder in the form of prostitution and some activity described as "shamelessness" and "unspeakable violence (*hubris*)." The decree expresses great indignation at license taking place in public spaces such as streets, gymnasia, or even shrines, "as if vessels for lustral water did not exist, nor laws." The decree can be read as a reaffirmation, through the civic institutions of the assembly meeting and the decree, of the old norms concerning the body and personhood of the adult male citizen (the undescribed "shamelessness" must designate passive homosexuality or male prostitution). But it also shows the existence of transgression and otherness within "free spaces" created even at the heart of the *polis*.[137]

In the present book I have argued for the durability of the *polis* form and its concerns (stateness, agency, the travails of integration, the relations between mass and elite, structuration, and territory) because of their constitutive impact. Here I simply end by gesturing at how to extend this history to include social history or urban history in all its richness and contradictions,[138] while maintaining the premise of the present book (and specifically of its concluding chapters), namely that

social history and urban history can only be understood if the political and institutional forms that constitute social spaces, directly and indirectly, are taken into account as crucial and even primary factors—the Aristotelian starting point of the *polis* and its history. The consequence is to take urbanization as a political phenomenon rather than just a bundle of lively social and economic interactions or, worst, just a material epiphenomenon of built environments in their impressiveness and durability.[139] The further consequence is that the study of the city is also about the promise of political forms and their impacts and costs.